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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Thus the heavens and the earth were finished 
and all the host of them. ~nd on the seventh 
day God ended His work which He had made. 
Genesis Ch. 2 
Since the beginning of history, a s~ecitio task 
has been associated with a definite l}eriod of time. This 
is the basis on which the majority of people are paid and 
is probably the best way of allocating economia goods. 
Harrington Emerson 1 .whose book1 is full of Bib~ 
lical allusions, says that the first and one ot the longest 
strikes in history occurred as a result of a cut in piece 
rates. Moses led the Children of Israel on a forty year 
walk-out in protest when they were given less straw ~ith 
-
which to make their bricks. 
Emerson also quotes the parable of the owner ot 
a vine-yard vmo had hired some grape pickers on a day rate 
basis. When noon-time oame and he saw that the job was 
progressing slowly, he went into the market place to hire 
some more help saying, "~batsoever is right I will give 
you.~ This seoond group of workers were paid the same as 
the first since they picked the same amount of grapes, 
1 Harrington Emerson, Efficiency as a Basis of Operation 
and Wages, The Engineering Magazine Co. 1914, pg.346 
but they only worked one halt as long. 
2000 years later, human nature is still the same. 
In the absence of a financial incentive, little work is 
done. Rebecca now wastes her employer's time telling 
P.aohel about the boy ahe met at the drug-store inutead 
of the st~anger she met at the well. 
Probably the tirst scientific approach to wage 
incentives wae that of Frederick w. Taylor in 1881 at the 
Uidvale Steel Works. Taylor, who later received a degree 
in mechanical engineerin~ from Stevens Institute as a 
reault of studying at night, made a gr,ea.t oontri but ion by 
uoing scientific means of determining a fair day's work. 
Using this as a basis, he built up a wage payment system 
that paid a generous reward (oO percent above day wages) 
for any worker who attained the predetermined daily taek. 
This system, combined with the savings made from motion 
studies, reduced the cost of handling material ove~ 50 
percent. 
Taylor's wage plan is the basis of many modified 
plajs that are used in industry to-day. However, plans 
of this type are generally opposed by labor unions for 
seve~al .reasons, one of the most important being the in-
ability of the average worker to understand them, and it 
does not appear at this time that they will ever supersede 
the basic piece rate type of wage plana. However, the 
tools that Taylor·developed for analysing jobs and the 
measurement of output are.the basis for the modern forms 
of piece rate wage payment systems. 
The modified form of the piece rate system that 
will be discussed in this paper is the 100% Time Premium 
Wage Plan with a guaranteed daily wage. A plan similar 
to this was used in a plant making radio tubes where the 
writer was employed in a supervisory capacity between 1943 
and 1947. This plan worked out well under both war and 
peace time conditions and in unionized plants as well as 
in non union plants. 
The majority of the illustrations that will be' 
used in this paper will be taken from a plant in which 
the writer was employed as plant manager in 1946 and 1947. 
The problem consisted of completing the re-conversion 
from war-time to peace-time operation which entailed the 
construction of different products although the operations 
were similar. 
These operations consisted, for the most part, 
of the welding of small nickel parts and their assembly 
with mica spacers and grids into the "mount~, which is 
the mechanical element of a radio tube before the sealing 
on of the "bulb~ and "base~ to make the complete radio 
tube. Tolerances were very tight and deviations as small 
•. 002" were su:tf1cient to scrap the entire assembly._ On 
the average day, 10,000 units were assembled~ 
Q.uality control was of the greatest importance 
and this was accomplished by having each team of three or 
four operators mark their oymbol on their work. Later~ 
when the defective tubes were analysed, these symbols were 
used to identify the persons responsible. "Scrap Bogie•" 
were set up ·on the basis of experience and this bogie, to-
gether with the correspo~ding "actual" figure, was posted 
daily on the team's blackboard. If bogie was beaten, a 
star was chalked up for the team. 
These •actual" :tigurea were the basis for many 
contests, each one of which lost its appeal after two or 
three months. One of the most successful was a plan of 
allowing the team which had the best accumulative score 
for the week the privilege of picking out their favorite 
phonograph record. This record was then bought by the 
company and played over the plant's public address system. 
It was customary to play records over this system about 
twenty minutes out of each hour and the music appeared to 
help the operators maintain the rhythm of their work. 
The plant was composed of one hundred women 
operators, three oupervisors, two inspectors, one stores 
clerk, one production clerk, one payroll clerk, one nurse, 
one mechanic, two men for heavy floor work and cleaning, 
and the plant manaser. He wao responsible for tho whole 
operations maintaining the working foroe'through hiring 
and firing, roquia1t1oning materials and shipping the 
completed work, planning and scheduling, production and 
quality control, and one hundred and one other Jobs. 
ntandard timeo for all jobs were set by time 
otudy and a ten percent allowance was ma4e for delay snd 
fatigue. lt wao customary to make an allowance in ad~ 
dition if an operator waa idle due to fnotors.beyond her 
control for over throe tenth's of an hour in any one day. 
!f new jobo were eet up, rates were determined aa quickly 
as poooible, generally within two weeko. 
~mployee turnover was lou and averaged tour per-
cent per month. Ralf of this wao due to sickness and oper-
ations; the other half being for cause, generally chronic 
aboenteeism or tardinees • or fa.ilure to come up to the 
standards set after a reasonable length of time, i.e. t~o 
montha. A relatively h~gh peraentnge of operators secured 
"leaven of absence" for operations probably due to the 
Company sponsored "~lue Crose and Blue nh1eld 0 plan. 
Attendance averuged ninety five ~ercent and. on 
thane daya when transportation facilities ~ere normal, 
ninety five percent ot the operators were at their work-
places within five minutes of the scheduled starting time. 
The wage plan used was similar to the One Hun-
dred Percent Time-Premium Wage Plan and it is the purpose 
of this paper to diseuse the characteristics of this plan 
giving illustrations from the writer's own experience. 
This wage plan is a modification of ~he straight 
piecework plan with the standards expressed in time per 
unit of production rather than money. In view of thie 
fact, the plan retains all of the advantages of the piece-
work plan and eliminates many of the disadvantages ot 
money rates. 
?or example, if a job has a base rate of·70 
cents per hour and otandard performance is .e minutes per 
unit, an operator ~ho makes 1000 units per day is paid 
for 600 developed minutes (10 hours) for. a total of 37.00. 
If he works 4 hours on this job, which we will call job A, 
making 500 units and is then transferred to job B, which 
has a standard of 1.2 minutes and a base rate of 80 cents, 
we will assume he wi~l produce 250 units in the rest of 
the working period. His pay will be computed as followsa 
,Tob A, 500 X .6 .;. 60 = 5 hours X $.70: $3.50 
Job 'B, 250 X 1.2 ~ €0: 5 hours X .so: 4.00 
Total (8 hours),. ·••••••••.••••••••••• 7.50. 
Another example will show the adaptability of 
the plan to different operator rates on the same job. 
necauee tfary Smith is ex.perienced in a number of jobs 
having base rates of 60¢, 70¢, and 80¢, she has been 
given the classification of "Spare operator~ and a base 
rate of 80¢ per hour which will apply to any job to ~hich 
she may be assigned, even the 60¢ per hour job. Assuming 
Lucy Jones is the regular operator on a certain job, we can 
set up the following examples 
Job C (base rate 60¢, standard .6 minutes) 
Mary Smiths 1000 X .6:-60::10 hrs.@ $.80:$8.00 
Lucy Joness 1000 X .6~ 60= 10 hrs. @ .60: 6.00 
In a situation such as the above, the foreman 
must be careful not to leave the spare operator on the 
job more than two or three days since Lucy Jones, seeing 
the same amount of work being done, will naturally feel 
that she should be paid 80¢ per hour too. 
One of the advantages of expresoing the various 
jobs in a plant on the basis of minutes per unit is in 
the facilitation of planning. If an order is received 
calling for 40 unite of Assembly A per minute and if this 
assembly involves sub-assembly B with a standard of 2.0 
minutes, sub-assembly C.with a standard of 1.0 minute, 
and sub-assembly D with a standard of 0.5 minutes, it is 
.easy to see that 80 operators will be needed on Job B 
(40 X~}, 40 operators on Job C (40 X 1), and 20 operators 
on Job D (40 X t). 
Since each of these jobs may have different 
base rates and hence different piece.rates, it would be 
more difficult to plan this job if the rates were expressed 
in money values. For, assuming the piece rate on Job B 
is 2 cents, it can be seen that this operation will cost 
80 cents per minute (40 X 2) but we have no direct ~ay of 
knowing how many operators this represents. 
This constitutes an important advantage as tar 
ae management is concerned and, in addition, the 100 % 
Time Premium Wage Plan, ~brough its establishment of the 
~standards" sets a goal of achievement for the operator 
and a benchmark by which the individual may Judge the 
amount of his work against that of his fellow employees. 
Failure ot wage incentive systems in the past 
can generally be traced to a few causes which are the fault 
of management rather than the system. Since these faults 
are not inherent to the systems, they will be discussed 
briefly as a whole rather than as faults of any one system. 
If wage incentive systems have a bad reputation 
with workers, it is because management has established 
rates, promising workers that these rates would not be cut, 
but then has out the rates when the operator by unusual 
effort earns a day's pay that management thinks is too high. 
This near-sighted view of management was more prevalent 
when incentive systems were in the experimental atage and 
rates were set by estimation rather than by scientific 
I 
time study. If a rate is properly worked out, there is 
little chance that the operator can •kill it"• 
lC 
However, so much damage has been done to the 
workers• morale 'that the fear of rate cutting is ever 
present. If this fear can be removed by building up the 
workers• confidence in management, amazing increases in 
production can be accomplished. The L. 0. ·smith and Corona 
Typewriters, Inc. has met this situation by giving their 
operators a written guarantee "to make no reduction in the 
rate of wage payment as long as the given operation con-
ditions, instructions for operator, class of labor required 
and quality of work specified, remain in effect."l 
~tanlet B. l~tthewson has written a very inter-
esting book giving examples of restriction of output among 
workers and has found the fear of rate cutting to be a 
major cause.2 This attitude is especially prevalent among 
workers of the older generation and is, of course, passed 
on by them to new workers coming into the plant. It will 
take extensive education plus a confidence building cam-
paign by management to modify this attitude. Furthermore, 
once management has installed an incentive system it should 
not be used in busy seasons and dropped in dull times as a 
method of wage reduction. 
A second characteristic of management •hich hurts 
all wage incentive systems ie its failure to make allowances 
1. R.H. Laneburgh and W~R. Spriegel. Industrial management 
3 'Ed., John F '"i ley &: Sons, Inc. New York 1946 pg. 408 ' 
2. ntanley ~. Matthewson, Restriction of Output amoP§ un-
organized Workers, The Viking Press, New York 1931 --
l. 
when an operator's production, and consequently hie pay, 
drop due to circumstances beyond the operator's control. 
This is a common occurrence, especially in war-time, when 
materials have to be used that have different. physical 
qualities than the materials used when the standard waa set 
on the job. For example, in spot ~elding, the degree of 
oxidation of metals may change considerably speed of the 
welding operation. 
Another common practice of management is to ask 
for special work to be done, either for the engineering or 
sales departments, for which no standard can be set in a 
short time. In cases such as the above, the foreman is 
generally so busy trying to cope with the special work that 
the adjustment of the worker's pay is forgotten until the 
next pay-day when the worker's check is short and a griev-
ance is created. 
Thio is due to the fact that most systems provide 
for paying workers in situations such as the above at their 
base rate. But this is not satisfactory if the operator has 
been averaging 20~ over his base pay, which is the usual 
case. The writer found that paying an average of the work-
er's past average earnings instead of the base rate paid 
dividends in employee good-will that far outweighed the few 
extra cents added to the pay-roll. No one, unless he has 
been a foreman himself, can appreciate the grievances and 
1: 
loss of morale that can occur on pay-days if three or four 
workers in a department receive leas than they expected, 
even to the extent of 20 or 30 cents. 
An indictment of all wage incentive systems is 
the difficulty of maintaining quality. This is seen in the 
advertisements of a few companies who still cling to the 
day rate method of payment. They claim, to enhance the ap-
peal of their product, that their workers put out a higher 
13 
quality product because they are "unhurried'". However, epEe d 
itself can be a means of securing quality. An operator can 
uaually only make standard or bonus by following the written 
standard practice for the job. This tends to give a higher 
. quality product than if the operator dawdlee along making 
~improvements" on the engineer's way of doing the job. 
In the writer's experience, he found that there 
~as a high correlation between speed and quality, i.e. the 
ranter workers turned out the better quality work. or 
course, eome of this effect was due to the non-financial 
incentive for quality that has been mentioned previously, 
i.e. the scrap bogies and the blackboards. If the pressure 
for quality work was taken off, it is probable that the cor-
relation between speed and quality would no longer exist. 
Lillian Gilbreth1 has listed eix points of psy-
1. Lilli an '.,f• Gilbreth, 'Psychology of llanagement, sturgis 
and ~alton Co. New YoTk, 1914, pg. 280 
chological significance that are applicable to all types 
of wage incentive systems. :Jhe calls them ncha.raoteristics 
of Reward" but they are readily modifiable to financial 
incentives. They are as follows: 
1. Positive i.e. not taking away something that 
was a draw-back 
2. ~redetermined i.e. before a man goes to work 
:3. "Personal 
4. Fixed, unchanged i.e. he must get exactly ~hat 
he ~as promised beforehand 
5. Assured i.e. he must be positive he will get 
the reward 
6. ?rompt i.e. he must know at once he has gotten 
the relYard and the reward object should 
be given him as soon aa possible. 
~ractical applications of these points ~ill be 
evident to anyone with supervisory experience. For example, 
an operator exposed to unusual heat should not have a fan 
, 
put at her VIOrkplace as a "reward". The compa11y should fur-
nish the fan as a matter of routine. Secondly, an operator 
going on a new job should be told the standard on the job 
and when he gets his pay-check, it muot be in accordance 
with this standard •. The-operator should have confidence 
that thio standard will not be changed. If the operator 
•'' 
cannot compute his own pay, ;_he ehou ld be told the amount 
of his earnings daily. The output of the ordinary type work-
er should be posted or·announced hourly. Finally, to. be· 
moot effective, the incentive pay, the "reward", the e:x ... 
cecs over his guaranteed wage should be in the form of a 
' 
separate pay envelope or check. 
14 
The ability of wage incentive plana to increase 
production has been studied by many investigators. Some of 
these reports are undoubtedly colored in favor of incentives 
so it is wise to find out what an impartial survey has shown. 
Edith u. Olsen, of the Department of Labor ntat-
istica, u. s. Government, wrote ~ reportl in 1943 concerning 
the effect of incentive payments on hourly earnings. She 
found that an analysis of statistics on ~ourly earnings of 
time and incentive workers in identical occupations in three 
important industries, machinery manufacture, cotton textile 
manufacture, and primary fabrication of non-ferrous metals, 
reveals a definite and substantial margin in favor of workers 
paid under the incentive plans. 
The data on median earnings showed that this ad-
vantage ranged from 12.1 percent in the primary fabrication 
of non-ferrous metals to 18.2 percent in the manufacture of 
machinery. 
Edith u. Oloen concluded that on the basis of 
fragmentary evidence available for individual industries 
that the incentive wage advantage is to be found in both 
union and non-union establishments, in both the north and 
south, and among women workers as well as men. 
1. Edith Marie Olsen, Effect of Incentive Payments on 
Hourly Earnings, UN 3 No. ?42-u.s. Gov. Print. Off.-y943 
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CH.t\FTER 2 
ATTRIBUTES OF A· SOUND WAGE INCENTIVE PLAN 
If an incentive plan succeeds in holding average 
production at a higher level of efficiency, the moderately 
constant overhead is spread over more units or production, 
' 
unit overhead is lower and thus total cost per unit is less. 
This is the principle by which wage incentive plane reduce 
industrial costs and is the basis of comparison of the many 
different types of plans. 
There seem to be ten attributes of a wage incentive 
plan that will best carry out this principle.l They are the 
following a 
1. A spur to the worker to reach a set task 
2. A guaranteed day rate 
3 Unrestricted as to amount of earnings 
4. Provision for learners 
5. Flexible to a change in product 
6 •. :Not complicated to aid the employee to compute 
his earnings 
7. Not complicated to allow the employer to co~ 
pute hie pay-roll easier 
a. An aid to predetermination of labor costs 
9. An aid to supervision 
10. Popular with management and unions 
The following chapters of this paper will discuss 
these attributes in detail. 
1. c. w. ~tle, Wage Incentive Methods, Rev. Ed., The Ronald 
Press, New York,~2, pg. 71 
J 
CH A Pl'rnt 3 
A SPUR TO THE WORKim TO REACH A SET TASK 
Few people realize, or at least little has been 
written, about the importance of consistent day to day 
production in an assembly plant. Consistent operation can 
bring about great savings in direct labor, substantial in-
creases in the workers• pay, higher production from the 
same number of workers, higher_ morale on the part of both 
worker and supervisor, and a substantial reduction in size 
of the work in process inventory. 
This ia due primarily to the fact that parts and 
assembly jobs can be balanced and operators can be more or 
lees permanently assigned to one job. This enables an 
operator to increase his skill and thus his production and 
earnings.· Inconsistent operation fosters the building of 
excessive work in process inventories which leads to the 
transferring of some operators to Jobs in which they have 
lese skill with the resulting loss of pay to them and an 
increase in cost to the company. This constant changing 
of jobs is also psychologically unsound since it breeds a 
feeling of insecurity in the worker. 
Insecurity is one of the basic fears of mankind. 
It seems to be one of the few fears with which we are born, 
the other fears being learned as we grow older. For example,· 
1' 
"'l!w "JftW''te!'!!nt!lf"'T"P3Pf¥WJWIPP'? "~'Ill mm.,.RRPRPRflf w•w=ymrnnaunes"""'t-- .... I 1 
a baby will cry and exhibit other evidences or fear if he 
is dropped a short distance but he remains emotionally un-
disturbed throughout a discussion of a possible drop in 
atock market prices. 
The importance of fear is that it brings about 
actual physical changes in the internal conditions of the 
body which are beyond the control of the individual. These 
changes include an increase in blood pressure and blood 
sugar, increased activity of the adrenal glands and sweat 
glands, and a cessation of the churning movements of the 
stomach. 1 These effects were valuable in primitive days 
since they helped a man to fight harder or run faster but 
for the present day man, who must live on a plane of re-
spectability far removed from animal instincts, these bodily 
changes are a source of great inconvenience. 
nuring the period that a person is subjected to 
these stimuli, he is literally not himself. Ris self con-
fidence is lessened, hie perspective distorted, and his 
. ability to think clearly is inhibited. It is easy to see 
that everything possible should be done by management to 
prevent fear of insecurity on the part of a worker. 
If a wage payment system can eliminate sources of 
the feeling of insecurity, it is a good system. One method 
of doing this is by the medium of a guaranteed wage which 
we will discuss in a later chapter. A second method is 
lE 
tNtilf'*'""'!t!''tm!"rnra'I"PDBP 5 M 5 8'PCPR'1 !0''5!1111 ''"'"'"UO'RPRRSRS!MMW' IIIJ.I'-Ii!!QPJJWIJJ~RM!IMMPV'8W.,RSITIJI'2' !T~li J2 ... 
by providing an incentive to reach a predetermined task 
consistently day after day. This will allow for the proper 
balancing of various parts and assembly jobs and thus pre-
vent the excessive transferring of workers to other than 
their regular jobs. 
Unfortunately, the 100~ Time Premium Wage Plan 
does not provide a strong incentive to reach a predetermined 
task. Under this system, a worker whose production is only 
60% or 70~ of standard will receive the same,pay as the one 
who is 100~ efficient since both of them will get their 
,guaranteed pay. It is only after the operator has exceeded 
the standard that he starts to earn bonus. 
This places an unnecessary burden on supervision 
whose task it is to bring the laggards up to standard. In 
the plant under discussion.this was done in the following 
manners 
1. The foreman, in a conference with the work-
er, established a definite period, usually two or three 
·weeks, at the end of which time the worker would be ex-
pected to have attained 100% efficiency. 
2. Daily schedules, gradually increasing from 
.the operator's present level up to standard, were prepared. 
3. These schedules, broken down into hourly 
quotas, were posted on the individual black-board, visible 
.to both the operator and the others in the department. Each 
hour the supervisor would post the worker's actual output 





4. Additional records were kept in the fore-
man's office llnd the · opern.tor was called in for U. further 
conference if ehe failed to make her quota on two con-
secutive days. 
5. At this second conference, the operator was 
told more apecificly that she must improve her production 
and a written notation was made on her record card that she 
~ould be discharged on a certain date if her production was, 
not up to standard by that time. 
' 6. At the expiration of this warning period, the 
operator was discharged. This ia the point at which the 
syotem ia most apt to break down. The average foreman sel-
dom has as much help as he needo and the loss of even a 
sub-standard worker will hurt his production schedule. It is 
an unple:H:~ant task for the foreman, if he is of the right 
type, to tell some-one that the end of the line has been 
reached and that he is being fired. But for the example to 
the other 99 workers in the plant, the decision must be put 
into effect. 
Thie system worked 90% of the time but, as we 
have shown previously, it is psychologically unsound since 
it ie based on fear. 
However, in addition to the disciplinary effect 
on the rest of the workers, the foreman has the satisfaction 
of seeing an improvement in his cost recorda. If the proper 
20 
; 
system of wage control is in operation. the amount of money 
required to ·•make-up" the sub-standard operator's earnings 
to her guaranteed pay has been charged against the foreman's 
record daily and he has the satisfaction of seeing this item 
disappear from the sheet the day after the sub-standard 
opera tor leaves. 
The above discussion, incidentally, .illustrates 
the importance of a foreman being familar with time-study 
procedure and the setting of rates. Unlees a foreman has 
confidence in the fairness of his rates and realizes that 
they contain allowances tor rest and delay, he may be in-
,. f'luenced by the worker's arguments that the rates are too 
11 tight" and he himself may become resentful towards the 
' management. 'For'"'this reason, management should include the 
fundamentals of time at~dy in the indoctrination of' their 
foremen. The writer absorbed his knowledge of rate setting 
in the plant by chance rather than as the result of any plan 
ot his superiors and has known foremen who have told their 
, ;operators that a rate was too "tight"' but that there was 
.. nothing that could be done about it. If a foreman doesn't 
' 
have confidence in his rates, certainly his workers will 
be confused and resentful. 
'"estinghouae Electric and vanufaoturing Company 
once used a Standard Time Wage Systeml and one ot the devices 
1. Hugo Diemer, v:age Pa;rment Plans, McGraw-Hill Publishing 
Co. New York, 1929, page 47 
21 
they employed to bring workers up to standard was a ~Fall 
nown~ card. This card was filled out daily when a worker 
was not 100~ efficient and gave the reason for not making 
the atandard. 
The virtue of this or similar devices is that it 
"makes an iseueft of the failure to make standard and serves 
to emphasize its importance to the individual worker. Its 
danger lies in the fact that additional routine work is 
placed on the supervisors who are apt to develop stereotype 
excuses for the v:orkers such aa ~poor material", "machine 
troubleft, which tend to conceal the basic trouble. 
However, to sum this chapter up, the 100~ Time 
Pre~Jum Wage Plan does not provide a strong incentive to 
reach a carefully set task and thus contributes to a feeling 
of in~ecurity on the part of the sub-standard worker and 
an increased burden for supervision. Other wage plans such 
as the Gantt Task and Bonus System Which pay a bonus o! 
from 20t to 50~ for making standard are probably more ef-
fective in this respect. 
CHAPTER 4 
A GUARANTEED DAY RATE 
The 100~ Time Premium Wage Plan usually provides 
for the payment of a guaranteed ba3e rate in the event that 
the operator fai.ls to make standard performance. In this 
way it differs from the straight piece rate plan from which 
it is derived. 
Guaranteed day rates are so universal in production 
jobs at the present time that, it may seem to be a waste of 
time to review their importance. Of course, all industries 
engaging in interstate commerce are subject to ~he minimum 
wages established by the Fair Labor Standards Act and many 
individual etatea have minimum wage laws affecting commerce 
within the state itself. 
However, the distribution industry circumvents 
these laws through the use of agents who work generally on 
a commission basis which is in effect a piece rate plan. 
Undoubtedly, the admitted high cost of distribution i's due 
to this factor since, by refusing to pay a guaranteed day 
rate, this industry must generally content itself with the 
cast-offs of the productive industries. 
In addition to attracting a higher type of em-
ployee, guaranteed day rates lend atabi 11 ty ·to both labor 
and management. By partially satisfying the workers' basic 
needs for a feeling of security, they reduce the rate of 
labor turn-over and facilitate planning and scheduling of 
23 
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production. 
The worker knows that if he attendo his job every 
day, he will be guaranteed ·the easenti~la of life: food, 
shelter, and clothing. These elements of security ~ill be 
his regardless of thA am~unt of work that he does. But, if 
he is ambitious for a·81ngle house, two pairs of pants with 
his auit, and dessert with his dinner, these items must be 
bought with the proceeds of hia incentive pay, which is 
the measure of his productivity above the average. 
In setting up a \lage payment ayotem, care must be 
used in establishing the minimum wage. It must, of course, 
conform with any state or federal law that may apply and the 
prev&iling rate in the community but it should not be set 
un-necessarily high. If the pay that can be taken home · 
without exerting much effort ia more than enough to maintain 
a minimum standard of living, many workers will be satisfied 
to do the least amount of work possible in order to keep 
their job. The average man is not ambitious to the point 
that he will endure unpleasant working conditions or hard 
physical work purely for the extra money to be earned, es-
pecially if he has only h!moelf to provide for. For his 
own eatiafaction he needs additional motives: the desire 
to send his children to college, to imitate the example set 
by people he admires or to drive a better automobile. 
This can be partly accomplished by keeping the 
guaranteed pay at a minimum, low enough eo that to enjoy 
anything boyond the bare essentials of physical existence 
a man muet drive himself to do things that he does not want 
to do. 
From a practical point of view, the guaranteed 
day rate is generally set by the prevailing hiring rate 
established in the community. The average plant, in normal 
times, io constantly hiring to replace workers who leave 
to get married, or to have children, or to go to different 
jobs. The hiring rate must be high enough to attract new 
workers and this hiring rate necessarily oets a minimum for 
the base rate. In other words, you can not hire a trainee 
at 70 cents per hour and then after two months tell her 
that her guaranteed rate will only be 60 cents since she 
will quit and get a job at another plant where she can 
start over again at 70cents. 
The 100% Time Premium wage Plan has an advantage 
over other wage plans in that it provides a system for 
using different base rates for different jobs or operators 
without complicating the computation ot the pay-roll. 
A variabls base rate , of course, bas many ad-
vantages. It can be used to differentiate between jobs 
in accordance with their difficulty, working conditions, 
degree of responsibility involved, and other factors con-
sidered in job evaluation; and it can also be used to 
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differentiate between workers due to length of service 
with the company or exceptional ability. 
Westinghouse ~lectric and Manufacturing Company 
had established five classes into which all their Jobs 
were segregated and a definite range of basic day rates 
were set up tor each class .1 A similar .. company for which the 
writer worked set up four categories of job classification 
which were known as A, B, C, and D with eaoh suooesaive 
rate paying two cents more per hour since the jobs were of 
increasing difficulty and responsibility. 
This system worked out satisfactorily and about 
the only trouble waa occasioned when an operator was trans-
ferred to a job which appeared to her to be similar to her 
previous job but which carried a lower base rate. A foreman 
muat be aware of the different base rates in his department 
and at the time of effecting a transfer remember to explain 
the reason for the lower rate. Sometimes in the confusion 
of transferring a large group of operators this aspeot may 
be over looked and will not come to light until a week or 
ten days later when the operator gets a pay check which 
may be a dollar or so lees than was expected. Thio can be 
not only a cause of hard feeling on the part of the op-
erator but her complaints to her fellow em~loyees may have 
1. Hugo Diemer, ~2~e Payment Plans, ~Graw-Hill Publishing 
Co., New York, 19 9, pg 47 
an upoetting etfeot on her whole department for at least 
the balance of the day. 
~very effort should be made to prevent an op-
erator from being disappointed on pay day. The average 
woman operator ha3 generally planned how she will spend 
every nickle .of her check and if her pay check is as much 
as a dollar short, it constitutes a maJor catastrophy. It 
was not an unusual occurrence for the writer to spend half 
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an hour checking records and trying to explain to an operator 
why her pay was less than she expected, even to the extent 
of differences or cnly twenty cents. 
This type of complaint ties in with the observation 
of Lillian Gilbreth, whom we have previously quoted, that 
"a worker must get exactly what he was promised beforehand." 
In the event of a transfer or other occurrence that is apt 
to effect the pay rate, the worker may assume that his rate 
of pay will be unchanged unless his foreman tells him dif-
ferently. 
Base rates may also be varied between operators 
to adjust for specific differences, the most common of 
these being seniority. In the way of an example, it was 
the practice in the plant under discussion to have three 
claosifioations called X, Y, and Z depending on the length 
of service. Each step meant a two cent per hour increase 
in the operator's base rate. Although the amount was small 
it gaTe the employee something to look forward to. 
The following points will summarize this section 
ot the discuseionr guaranteed day rates are desirable since 
they giTe a feeling of security to the worker and lower 
coste to management by lowering labor turn-over and training 
expense. The 100~ Time Premium Wage Plan provides for a 
p,uaranteed base rate and the method of computation is such 
that base rates may be varied to compensate for differences 
between jobs and seniority among workero without extra 
clerical expense in the pay-roll department. 
However, guaranteed rates should only be high 
enough to provide for the actual physical needs of the 
worker so that he will have an incentive to strive for the 
luxuries he may receive by earning more than his standard 
wage. 
28 
-· -•- ~ .. - ·---· - -' 
CHAPTER 5 
UHRRSTRICTED. AS TO AHOUNT OF E;\RNINGS 
In order to unleash the latent ability of the 
average worker, he must be thoroughly convinced that he 
, wi 11 not be penalized if he does t"ioe as much work as 
he has been doing on a day rate basis. This is the hardest 
point to get across, especially to the older age groups •. 
They have had long and generally bitter experience with 
management especially in the 'Twenties when they were run 
over by halt trained "Efficiency Experts" who set rates on 
an unscientific busis and then later cut these rates as 
the workers reached out for the additioual rewards that 
had been promised to them. Then, more recently, they have 
observed the policy of top management for constant change 
which brings a procession ot new industrial engineers with 
new schemes into their factory. Even though the worker 
m~y feel secure under one foreman and produce to the extent 
of his ability, he has no long run guarantee that the next 
manager may not change the policy and rob him of any gains 
he has made. 
However, the advantages .to be gained on the part 
of management are so large that every conceivable effort 
should be made to secure the confidence of the worker to 
the point that he will produce to his capacity. I have 
personally seen productive workers on assembly jobs in-
crease their output 100% over a period of two weeks after 
a standard had been set for their ·job and they acquired 
the confidence that they would be paid for their increased 
output and their rates would not be cut. 
In the assembly plant in which the writer worked 
during ~orld war II, the management established the policy 
that the top bonus that could be earned was 140% of standard. 
This out-off was set up on the assumption that if an oper-
ator exceeded this amount, the quality of her work would 
be inferior. ~ut this did not prove to be the case, as 
the writer has previously pointed out, since the work put 
out by the faster workers waa, on the average, better than 
the work of the slower workers. 
Thin cut-off was established on a shift basis. 
That is, assuming a standard of .6 minutea, the out-off 
performance was figured 8 X 60 f .6 X 140~, ~ total of 
11?.0 pieces. The operator was allowed to leave the plant 
after abe bad made this quota even though she only took. 
five or six hours to make the schedule. Those operators 
who were able to complete their work in six hours (about 
10% of the operators in the department) actually worked 
at a rate of 187% efficient for the hours they were in the . 
Plant. The quality of the work produced at this high 
rate of speed was better than average but the question of 
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qunlity if they were allowed to continue for a full eight 
hour shift was never officially established. In other words, 
could these operators make 1496 pieces at good quality with 
a standard of 800 per day? 
Some of the sub-assemblies made were very small 
(the complete assembly was smaller than the terminal phalanx 
of your little finger) with the result that it was common 
practice for the taster operators to do work in excess of 
their out-ott and hide it from their supervisor. In this 
fashion, they could save up two or three hours work which 
they would have in to their supervisor some Friday after-
noon when they wished to get out ot work earlier than usual. 
The supervisors were aware of this fact and did 
what they could to discourage it for several reasons. One 
of the most realistic reasons was the fact that changes 
were frequently made in the parts and unless the operators 
~ere given at least a day's notice that the change was 
coming, they were unable to get their hidden inventories 
into production before the work was scheduled to come along 
with the new part. If this happened, that is if the work-
ere were unable to get rid of their inventories with the 
old part, supervision had to maintain 100% inspection for 
an indefinite period thereafter to prevent this inventory 
being fed into the regular production. It was not an 
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unuaual occurrence to find a part which supposedly had been 
changed a month ago turn up in current production. 
This then ie one of the reasons against limiting 
the amount that a worker can make in a day. The effect is 
not to limit the amount actually made in the day but to 
limit the amount of work turned in to the supervisor. The 
hidden inventories can be a source of poor quality and also 
the cause of poor morale. The operator who does this sort 
of thing, kn9wing that it is contrary to company policy, has 
a feeling of dishonesty and resentment against management. 
The main reason for not restricting output is one 
of productivity and ooste. After all, we are installing 
an incentive for the purpose of decreasing our overhead per 
unit made and if an operator can make 1496 units in the 
eame length of time the standard operator is making 800, 
her overhead per unit is about one half. This is because 
~oot overhead consists of salaries, depreciation, and bond 
intereot which vary as a function of time rather than as a 
function of output. 
At this time, the need for productivity to fight 
inflation is almost as vital an the need to fight 'the J'aps 
three years ago, but the patriotic motive which spurred 
many workers to high levels of productivity in lacking. 
Especially during the War, it was hard to condone letting 
an operator leave her Job after six hours work when the 
m~terial eho waa making was needed for shells to blast the 
Jap suicide pilots out of the air before they could sink 
our ships. 
The plant under discuooion was a favorite visit-
ing spot tor disabled heroes during the War and it was often 
the writer's privilege to show them through a department. 
nome of the more obeerTing saw operators leaving their work-
places an hour or two before the ohift ended and asked the 
reason why. The answer that ~they had finished their day's 
work" was hnrd enough to justify and I never got up courage 
enough to tell them the truth, i.e. that ~h~y had produced. 
the limit that the company allowed th~i4 to make in one day. 
Needless to say, the oubject of "out-off" was the 
favorite topic of lunch table diucuasion among foremen. 
Few arguments could be found in favor of it except the ar-
gument that it was the company's wage policy and should not 
be changed for that reason. The arguments against· it could 
well be summed up by saying "Why should you send your best 
workers home after a six hour day and let the poorer ones 
work for eight hours." 
An inequality in the out-off type of system is 
found in a department using machines to pace operations. 
In accordance with company policy it· is impossible to set 
a rate which will exceed 140% efficiency; i.e. if a machine's 
daily capacity is 1120, then this figure can be taken as 
140~ efficient in determining the operator's rate but you 
33 
FE' •wecen 
can't c~ll it 150< because you have told your op~rators 
that anything over 140~ is conducive to poor quality. 
Therefore, the best the operator of this machine can do 
is 140~ and it will take her the full eight houra of the 
shift to do it. She m~ be a better worker than some of 
the others on unp~ced operations ~ho can make top production 
and go home an hour or two early every day. 
The answer to the above may be in proper job 
evaluation and in setting the proper base rates. However, 
in the plant under discussion, both these jobs fell in 
the highest oategor,y of direct labor and both had the same 
base rate. Thus at the end of the week, both operators 
would have the same gross paya the girl on the machine 
paced job worked forty hours whereas the unpaced operator 
may only have worked thirty or thirty five hours. Conditions 
of this sort are the kind that breed grievances. 
It, and when, the writer establishes a plant of 
hie own, he will probably establish some kind of an upper 
ceiling for earnings but it will be in the vicinity of 160% 
efficiency and will be flexible to the extent that it can 
be revised upward but not downward. Wechler has said 1 
that the beet worker is 100~ better than the poorest but 
if our standards are properly set, the poorest worker will 
1. David ~echler, !h! Range of Human Capacities, Williams 
and Wilkins, Baltimore, Ud. 1935 pg. 73 
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probably not exceed 80% efficiency. Only those of the so-
called super-skill category, probably betwee~ one and two 
percent, ~ill be able to exceed L50% if the rates are proper~ 
ly set and tbese tew should be allowed to go home early as 
-
a psychological effect on the others. The ability to go 
home ahea4 of time as a reward for good work has high in-
oentiTe value. 
In summation then we have three good reasons why 
management should not set a limit on output: 
One, limitation on output may become a limitation 
not on actual output but on reported output with the chance 
of poorer quality work and lowered employee morale due to 
"hidden inventories". 
. 
Two, limitation of output io harmful to employee 
morale and a source of grievances unless special efforts 
~re made to iron out base rate difficulties especially 
between machine paced and unpaced operations. 
Three, limitation of output causes higher over-
head unit costs and loss of worker productivity which is 
badly needed in case of war or inflation due to a shortage 
of manufactured goods. 
The 100% Time Premium Wage Plan does not limit 
production. The ~orkerts earning depend on what he produces 
~ithout any limitation. 
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CHAPTER 6 
PROVISION FOR LE,~NERS 
Provision for paying new workers during their 
training period under the 100% Time Premium Wage Plan is 
through the guaranteed day rate discussed in a previous 
chapter. The new employee is hired at the base rate and 
is assured of regular automatic increases as his length 
of service accumulates. 
However, the basic plan does not provide incentives 
for gradual improvement up to the point at which the employee 
is ready to earn bonus. In other words, if the daily stand-
ard is 1000 pieces, there is no financial incentive for the 
trainee to increase his production from 600 to 800 pieces 
per day. This is due to the fact that he will receive his 
same base pay for both productions. 
There are two w~s of attacking this problema 
the first is indirectly through cost records fer· the fore-
man, and the second is through the use of so-called tr~in· 
1ng curves for the employee. 
It is reasonable to charge the wages of a new 
employee against an account for training for a period of 
two weeks or a month depending on the difficulty of the 
job. However, after this period, the foreman should be 
given each day a statement of the wages paid to each new 
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employee as contrasted with his actual earnings and the 
foreman should be held accountable for the difference. k 
policy should be established as to how long a new employee 
should be giTen to attain standard performance and a 
decision made to keep or fire the employee should be made 
at the end of this deadline •. 
~Y calling the foreman's attention daily to the 
cost of training his new help, he will devote more time to 
improving his trainees and the records put out by the cost 
department give him a powerful tool to use with the in-
diYidual ~orker. For example, he can call Rachel into the 
office and show her that on the previous day she actually 
earned only $3.58 but she was paid $5.60, her base pay, 
and the difference of $2.02 was a red mark against the 
department. The new employee is generally unaware that 
records of this sort are kept by the company and ehe is 
more likely to strive for steady improvement if she is 
aware of their existence. 
The second, more direct approach to the problem 
consists of the use of up-grading curves and training curves. 
These curves are simply daily schedules of improvement that 
the trainee is expected to maintain. However, in the later 
stages of training some small financial incentive may be 
added. At the time of the trainee's indoctrination to the 
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plant, she ohould be given a general idea that she will be 
expected to attain standard by the end of six weeks or what-
ever period is needed for ~he job she is being assigned to. 
Then, about two weeks later, after ohe has become somewhat 
familar with her Job and the plant she should be told more 
speoifioly what her daily improvement should be. 
The supervisor keeps daily records of the train-
ee's progress comparing it with the UP-grading curve and 
calling the toreman•a attention to substantial deviations 
from the normal progress. These curves are generally set 
up on the basis of experience in training other girls on 
similar Jobs. 
There is one important aspect to be considered 
in the construction of a learning curve and that is the 
fact that the rate of learning is not constant for the so• 
called ~motor skills", i.e. skills involving training the 
fingers. hands, and muscles of the body. Many tests have 
shown that learning is rapid at first but then reaches a 
plateau during which for a period of a few days or a week 
increase in efficiency practically ceanes. 1 This is appar-
ently nomething beyond the power of the learner to control 
and several explanations have been offered of the possible 
cause. These plateaus appear more often in the learning 
1. I. P. Alford and S. R. Bangs, Editors. Production 
Handbook, The Ronald Press, New York, 1944, Pg. 1218 
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of complex jobe. 
Bryan and Harterl observed theee plateaus in ex-
periments on learning to send nnd receive telegraPhic 
messages and they suggest that the plateaus represent periods 
in the course of learning "here the lower order of habits 
are being thoroughly organized and established. This mas-
tery of simpler habits, they believed, was necessary before 
the learner could pass on to higher unite of, performance. 
However, as foremen, we are not so much interested in what 
cauBes these plateaus as in the fnct that they do exist and 
ure beyond the power of the individual to control. 
The writer observed plateaus in learning to 
assemble small metal parts with spot welders in the con-
otruction of radio receiving tubes. Girls of average ability 
would progreso to a point of about 75~ efficienoy in three 
or four weeks' time and then all forward progress would atop 
for ten days or two yeeke. Then. just aa mysterious~, pro-
gress would begin again and oontinue up to about 110% of 
standard and stop again. In eo:ne ca~os, after a lapse of 
progress for two or three weeks, the increase in speed 
would reappear and continue up to 130% or 140%. nome 1n-
d1 Tidual operators eventually r~ached 185~ efficiency. 
At the time, the writer was unaware of the ex-
perimental etudiea by psyohologieta and attributed the 
William L. Bryan and Noble Harter, studies ~ !h! Telegraphic 
LanguQie, The Aoquisi tion of a Hierarchy .2f. Habi te, 
Psycho ogical Review, 1899, 6, pg. 345-375 
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the resumption in the rate of progress to other factors, 
ouch as talks to the operators and other pressure bro~ght 
upon them to increase their speed. The writer made much 
use of blackboards on which the daily production of each 
operator "'u.s posted with stare being given to thoee who· 
did an exceptionally good job. These blackboards probably 
supplied the incentive for the improvement but this im-
provement had to wait upon the neural changes in the worker 
to consolidate the results of the previous learning before 
going ahead to attack the next higher level of learning. 
The unfortunate thing about these plateaus ia 
that the foreman is likely to lose potentially good work-
ers unlesn he is aware of their exiatence. The writer can 
recall two or three oases in which a trainee had made no 
progress for a week and was called into the office and 
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given an ultimatum to the effect that she either show eub-
stantiu.l improvement within the next weekor be fired. At 
the end of the week, since there was no improvement, the 
trainee left the company. It may well be that these girls 
~ere experiencing the ~plateau" described above and, if they 
had been given a little more time, would have broken through 
the consolidation period and emerged into the area where 
their speed would have picked up again. 
Several girls left the plant or their own volition 
during the plateau period when they became discouraged with 
not being able to ohow any improvement. 
It would be ~ell then for the foreman in plan-
ning the up-grading of new operators to take thia factor 
into consideration, especially on the more complex jobs. 
Speciticly, he should allow for a period at the point where 
the operator has attained about 75,-g efficiency for a. period 
of a week 1~ wh~ch no improvement ~ill be expected or re-
quired. The main trouble the foreman will have will be in 
convincing h13 superior of the wisdom of this plan since 
the common aaoumption among production executives is that 
a trainee is capable of maintaining a steady increase in 
efficiency. 
Confirmation of this theory ia reported by 
Alford and Bangs, editors, 1 who say 
It is often assumed, in working out plane for 
remunerating new em~loyees, that a steady in-
crease in efficiency ehould be expected from 
them. It is a fact that for the average work-
er, when he or ehe has exhausted about one 
half of the normal training period, there must 
be expected a period of time, depending on the 
n~ture of the work, where progress or skill 
practically ceases. Then after a short while 
he attains the balance of average proficiency 
very rapidly. Eapecially in plants employing 
female labor, loss of operators before they 
have become fairly efficient is a serious 
problem, due largely to the fact that their 
remuneration ie based upon a required constant 
increnne in proficiency which in practically 
imposai ble for the ''average worker,_ to maintain. 
1. L.P. Alford and J.R. Bangs, Editors, Production Handbook, 
The Ronald Press, New York, 1945 pg. 1218 
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Day on Scheduled Scheduled Hourly Pay Hourly Pay 
Curve 'Efficiencf Production it made it not made (percent (gross) (cent a) (cents) 
1 5 40 65 65 
2 10 ao 65 65 
3 15 120 65 65 
4 P.O 160 65 65 
5 25 200 65 65 
6 30 240 65 65 
7 35 ~80 65 65 
a 40 320 65 65 
9 45 360 65 65 
10 50 400 65 65 
11 55 440 68 65 
12 60 480 68 65 
13 64 512 68 65 
14 68 544 68 65 
15 72 576 68 65 
16 76 608 68 65 
17 78 624 68 65 
18 78 624 68 65 
19 78 624 68 65 
20 78 624 68 65 
21 78 624 68 65 
22 81 648 72 65 
23 84 672 72 65 
24 87 696 72 65 25 90 720 72 65 26 93 744 72 65 27 96 768 72 65 28 99 792 72 65 29 102 816 72 65 30 105 840 74 65 
Fig. 1 A O&mple !Aarning Cune 
z 
Taking the above factor into consideration, 
it io possible to construct a learning curve and pay the 
trainee a.emall bonus, like two or three cents an hour 
over the baoe rate for the days on which the schedule is 
made or exceeded. But, one more word of onution, this 
curve should bring the operator to a point of about 105~ 
efficiency eo that when she oompletea her learning curve, 
her earnings, baaed on standard ~ill be at least as high 
an she has been earning ~hilo she was undergoing the 
training period~ 
'Fig. 1 is a sample of such a curve for a trainee 
receiving a RUaranteed rate of 65 canto per hour whom we 
wish to train in 30 dayo for a job that pays a baae rate 
of 70 cent A per hour. This curve gives some financial in-
centive after 50~ efficiency ia reached, provides for a 
week'A plateau period, and then a decided bonus, i.e. 
neven cents anlhour to help bring the operator up to 100% 
efficiency. It should be noticed aleo that the earnings 
on the last day are the same ae the operator will earn if 
her pay is eompu+.ed by the regular procedure. 
To recapitulate, the 100% Time Premium waee Plan 
;>rovides 'for trainees through the gua.ra.ntecd baoo rate but 
needs to be supplemented by financial or non-fin~ncial in-
centives to allow for progress within the training period. 
Training curves should be carefully thought out with due 
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consideration tor t.he "'plateau" period which ie likely to 
occur ~bout half-way through the training period during 
"Which time progress ntands otill due to factors beyond the 
control of the trainee. The foreman should be aware of this 
phenomenon ao that he may restrain the impulae to fire the 
trainee and instead encourage the \"10rker to prevent his 
giving up the job through diacouragement. 
Cotst accounting recorda my be ueed to good ad· 
vantage to remind the foreman of and to ohow the worker the 
cotst of training. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Fl&XIBI.& TO A CHANGE IN PRODUCT 
~ plant using the 100~ Time Premium Wage Plan 
takes adTantage of the guaranteed day rate feature of the 
plan to provide for ita employees during a change over 
period. Change is the concomitant of growth and any plant 
~hose wage plan does not provide for frequent changes in 
product and processes is badly handicapped. 
A TUriation of the above plan to the extent of 
guaranteeing the employee an average of his past earnings 
computed over the immediately preceeding ten weeks is gain-
ing favor, particularly among employees and unions. This 
plan is based on the idea thnt the employee should not 
suffer wage decreases for reasons beyond his control but 
at the same time it does not seem right that the employer 
should be called upon to bear the full cost of a change over 
which will ultimately benefit both the employee and the 
management. Bonus wages are paid for productivity above the 
average and the worker does not come up to standard for two 
or three weeks following a change in product or process. 
However, if workers are paid their past average 
wages. it should be understood in advance that this policy 
will exist tor only a limited period of time, i.e. two weeks, 
and at the end of that time, the employee will be paid on 
the baeio of his actual production on the new job. Other-
wise. there will be no incentive to learn the new Job and 
the operator can coast along while receiving the same rate 
of pay he enjoyed when he was working hard on hie old job. 
Payment of past average earnings baa the added 
disadvantage of requiring considerable extra work on the 
part of the pay-roll department which must go back through 
ita records and average the earnings of each individual em-
ployee tor the ten week period. This is necessary since, in 
the average plant using an incentive system. an employee's 
pay for successive weeks is seldom the same and may vary 
substantially from week to week. 
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CHAPTER 8 
BASE OF COMPUTATION OF PAY BY EMPLOYEE 
All writera in the field of wage payment systems 
agree that the syatem should be simple enough so that the 
average worker can understand the system and compute his 
own pay. 
Fred Joinerl has summarized this aspect very well 
as tollOWBI 
In oomputting workers• pay for their output, the 
more complex systems make use of formulas that 
are confusing to most of t~e workers. Their pay 
is not calculated by the mere number of pieces 
produced but by means of some special unit such 
as a "manit" or a ~B-hourR, Workers claim that 
the use of a complex formula for wage payment 
facilitates rate cutting, because changes in the 
production standards that affect the unit of 
measurement may be concealed from them. Whether 
the rate cutting occurs or not, the worker finds 
it difficult to check the relationship between 
his pay and his output or effort. 
The 100~ Time Premium Wage Plan, being as it is 
a derivative of the piece rate plan, is one of the easiest 
plane for the computation of wages. The worker need only 
multiply his day's production by the standard and divide 
by 60 to get his· total standard hours. This he multiplies 
by the baee rate on the job, or by his own base rate as ex-
plained in the example or the "spare operator", to find 
his day's pay. 
1. Fred H. Joiner, Incentive ~ Plans and Collective 
nargaining, tr,s. Gov. Printing Off., washington n.c. 
I942 #717 ~.6 
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-This computation can be shown in the terms of 
a commonly uoed tormulaa 
R, H8Rh 
where R is earnings, H8 is standard hours, and ~h is the rate per hour. 
For example, if production is 1000 units and the 
standard is .6 minutes with a base rate of 70¢ 
X: ( 1000 X .6 ):-60 X .70: 10 X .?0:. $? .00 
;,imple as the system appears, some workers still 
have trouble in computing their pay. The writer received 
so many inquiries such as "Ho• many an hour do I have to 
make to earn 80¢ per hour?" that he prepared scheduleafor 
each job showing the hourly production necessary to earn 



























Another factor which is common to all systems 
except the day rate system is the computation of pay for 
any idle time due to factors beyond the worker's control, 
for example, waiting for material. Generally, time wasted 
in this fashion is paid at the base rate and must be added 
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to the amount earned by the worker plus the payment for his 
re 11 ef period. Since time of this sort ia usually in decimals :· 
such as .7 hours and the base rate some odd figure like 74%, 
the average worker has trouble in computing his pay. 
Another fairly common problem arose when an operator 
with a base rate of 70¢ per hour who had been averaging $?.00 
per day due to her bonue (roughly 88¢ per hour) had waiting 
time of .8 hours, payable at ?Oi per hour. If the operator 
asked the supervisor how many additional pieces per hour 
she would have to make to compensate for the difference, the 
supervisor herself would have trouble in finding the answer. 
The above examples are given to illustrate the 
difficulty the average woman worker has in computing her 
pay and to emPhasize the necessity of keeping the mathemat-
ical computations on the lowest level poseible. The v~iter 
experienced difficulties with a eimple type of wage plan 
and can imagine the troubles of a foreman of n plant which 
uees one of the more complex types. 
Another type of schedule that worked out well was 
a daily listing of the amount earned by each worker on the 
previous day. This also served as an incentive, particular-
ly in cases involving group bonuses. Uost of the jobs in 
the plant involved teams or unite ranging from three to 
fifteen operators with the pay of each individual being set 
by the daily output of the group to which she wao attached. 
The pays of the best teams could exceed that of the poorest 
by 40 percent and it gave the foreman a chance to emphasize 
the larger pay received by the more productive workers. 
It a worker complained to her foreman about her 
pay being poor, he could refer to the oohedule and point 
out to her that another girl doing the same type of work 
had earned 15 oente.more per hour and explain the fact that 
if other girls could make this money, she could if she tried. 
The only trouble with such a schedule is that it 
gives additional work to the pay-roll department and, when 
the inevitable slash comes in the indirect pay-roll, ser-
vices such as the above are among the first to be out out. 
Rowever, it the pay-roll department can give the production 
department such a list daily, it not only keeps the worker 
informed as to his daily pay but also brings to light mis-
takes in pay that can be corrected immediately rather than 
waiting a week until the pay-check is isoued. 
To summarize this chapter, we have two main points; 
one, workers can figure out their earnings immediately and 
have the feeling that there are no hidden factors that the 
company can change if the computation of wages is made easy, 
and, necond, with the exception of the simple day rate plan, 
the 100~ Time Premium wage Plan is. the easiest system for 




E ~SR OF COllPUTATION OF PAY BY EMPLOYh'R 
The employer, too, finds the 100% Time Premium 
'
11age Plan easy to compute. He, of course·, usee the same 
basic formula but finds his computations slightly more 
complicated due to the necessity of making adjustments for 
differences in the job base rates and the rates paid to 
individual workers for their "relief" and "downtime" periods. 
•Downtime", •hiah has been referred to before, is 
the ~aiting time of a worker due to lack of material, break-
down of machines, and other interferences with production 
beyond the worker's control. For example, a new employee 
who3e guaranteed wage io 65¢ pe~ hour may be earning 70t 
by making standard on a rated job. But if he has downtime 
he is paid .at the 65¢ rate. 
Aosuming that relief time is .3 hours, the job 
base ra~e is ?0¢, standard is .6 minutes, amount of work 
produced is 800, and downtime is .5 hours, the pay will be 
c!omputed a.e follows a 




8 standard hours :ij • '10 : 
.3 hours ~.65 





The Pay-roll Department can further simplify its 
computations by expressing the standards as decimal hours 
I - • H . I 
vrr !" &Q§' ; •111 ., •• 
that is, .6 minutes equals .01 hours. The computation of 
the abaTe example the becomesa 
800 X .01= 8 Standard hours @.70 •••••• $5.60 
The ayatem of cost accounting control outlined 
in the chapter on "Training" consists of subtracting the 
actual earnings from the guaranteed base pay and listing 
these amounts by the names of the sub~standard operators. 
A total for each department can be prepared daily as a 
control for a top.executive who can thua easily follow the 
progress of the Tarious departments in their efforts to 
bring sub-standard operators up to 100% efficiency. This 
control also shows the coat of making changes and may be 
a tool to train higher executives to think twice before 
they order a production department to change a process Juet 
to satiafy the whim of the engineering department-
The basis of any pay-roll system is the attendance 
book and the time card. Time cards are generally made up 
t~o or three days ahead of time and contain the employee's 
name, date, department, pay-roll number, and the employee's 
clnsa1t1cat1on as regards automatic increases for seniority, 
i.e. 0-6 months, X, 6-18 months, Y, and over 18 months, z. 
This card is placed in a rack arranged by pay-roll number 
and the operator, on entering the department to go to work, 
inserts the card into a time clock which prints the time of 
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day ~preseed in decimal hours. For example, if the shift 
starto at 7t00 a.m. the time clock might well be adjusted 
to print o.o rroo 6:57 to 7t03 inclusive. 
~ring the course of the day, the operator writes 
on her time card, subject to the instructions of her auper-
viaor, the description of her job and the respective time 
~pent on each job if she works on more than one job during 
the course of the day, and the code number of the job. For 
the new employee, this code number would indicate that her 
wagee were to be charged aguinat utrainingM and for a stores 
clerk the code number would repreeent a charge against 
"indirect labor•. The day • s production may be entered on 
this card but in the plant under consideration the worker's 
output wao recorded on a different form by the supervisor. 
At the end of the shift, the operator reinserts her time 
card into the clock which again punchs the time, i.e. 8.8, 
assuming a 45 minute lunch period, and drops the card into 
a box beside the clock. 
The cards are then picked up by a representative 
of the pay-roll department and, the following day, the pay 
ie computed from the information on the card supplemented 
by the supervieor•s report of the operator's output. The 
computer, using the job description, finds the standard 
in his rate book and the job base rate which he uses to 
compute the pay as outlined above. The charges are made to 
-
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the proper accounts on the basis of the various code numbers 
appearing on the time card. The times recorded by the cloak 
are only considered in the event an operator was late or 
left the plant early. However, if he had made "cut-off'" 
production, he is paid for the full eight hours regardless 
of the time his card was punched "out", 
OVertime is allowed only on rare occasions and 
the card must be signed by the foreman if any overtime is 
claimed. Tn the event of work in excess of' 40 hours in 
one week, the average hourly straight time is determined, 
divided by two, multiplied by the number of hours in exceso 
of forty and added to the total straight time as the over-
time premium. In this way, the employee receives the bene-
fit of his higher production over the regular forty hour 
period and is not penalized in hie overtime premium for his 
production which is generally lower after the forty hour 
point has been reached in any one week. 
Various methods have been devised by operators to 
beat the aboTe pay system but an experienced fore~n can 
generally ferret them out. One ot the most popular methods 
is tor an operator to punch "in" the card of a friend who 
he knows will be late. The way to beat this is to have the 
foreman and the supervisors on the floor at the beginning 
of' the shift and within five minutes determine who is absent 
by a physical check. Then the unpunched cards can be taken 
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from the rack and compared. If any discrepancies are found, 
the foreman can watch for the offender to come in and watch 
hie actions. If an honest mistake has been made, the worker 
will go to hie auperTisor or foreman to get hie time card, 
but it the plan has been prearranged, he will go to his work-
place aa inconspicuously aa possible. This system will trap 
one half or the team, but it is virtually impossible to 
find the operator who punched the other's without watching 
each worker as he punchs the time clock. 
This habit of picking up time cards within five 
minutea ot the beginning of the shift also discourages 
tardineos since it means the worker who is late must go to 
the foreman's office to get his card. The foreman also has 
the advantage of being in a position to make plans quickly 
for changes in his schedule or operators to compensate for 
the absentees. 
Another w~y to beat the system in a poorly run 
shop ia to steal back work that has been previously turned 
into the supervisor and reporting it again as new product-
ion. Thio can be overcome by the supervisor's picking up 
and recording the amount of work at the end of a definite 
Period, usually every hour, and then physically removing 
the work to an enclosed area or store-room from which it 
can only be removed by some authorized person. Unless this 
is done, the toremsm may find himself in the embaraseing 
position ot having reported a certain number of units as 
having been made according to his pay-roll sheets but not 
being able to produoe them when a Physical inventory is 
taken. 
Another type of stealing occurred in the writer's 
experience but there was never sufficient evidence to put 
the blame on any particular operator. A certain small eub-
usaembly ~as made in the parts department which occupied 
a corner ot a large room which was used for ~saembling the 
whole unit in such a fashion that the operators in the 
parts department had access to the whole room. The work 
would be picked up at the end of each hour, taken to the 
ctore-room but at the same time similar sub-assemblies were 
being issued out to the assembly department. on several 
occasions, atter the lunch period, an operator in the_ assem-
bly department would ask her supervisor for additional quan-
tities to replace material which had disappeared during the 
lunch hour. One parts operator was suspected because she 
~as in the habit of returning to her work-place early, ap-
parently to write letters but she was never caught in the 
act of stealing the material. 
one way to attack a problem of this sort is by 
the uee of standard waste ratios for each part and assembly. 
~aste ratioo are a necessity for planning and scheduling 
especially in the manufacture of radio tubes where many 
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parts are amall or fragile. If the usage of a part is ex-
ceeding its standard waste ration without any assignable 
cauoe, euob aa excessive scrap, the answer may well be that 
aome·one io stealing the part. Another solution is to have 
a person or the ouperTieory level stay in the department 
during the lunch period to restrain petty thievery of this 
type. 
One male clerk was able to handle the computation 
of the pay-roll for 100 operators using a plan similar to 
the l~Of Time Premium Wage Plan. In addition, he was able 
to handle the telePhone switch-board, act as receptionist, 
and handle claims under the company's group accident and 
health policy. 
To summarize then, we find that the lOO% Time 
Premium Wage Plan is comparatively simple for the employer 
to compute and that a few simple precautions on the part 
of the foreman can prevent any dishonest attempts of the 
employees to "beat• the plan. 
In the average plant uoing this system, one pay-
roll clerk should be able to compute the pays of at least 
one hundred employees. 
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CHAPTER 10 
L\BOR COST F.REDETERMINATION 
In a period of high competition, the management 
which can accurately and quickly predict its labor coste 
in bidding for new business has a distinct advantage, and 
the tools for such predictions are to be found in the 100% 
Time Premium Wage Plan. 
As has been pointed out before, this plan pre-
supposes the setting up of standards for each job in the 
plant which aerTe aa the basis for determining the number 
of employees, at definite predetermdned base rates, that 
will be needed to fulfill the contract. 
?or example, let us suppose that a bid is re-
quested for an aasembly which upon analysis is broken down 
into 1000 standard houro of class B work at a base rate 
of 70¢, 600 standard hours of class C work at 75¢, and 300 
standard hours of class D work at 80¢ per hour, the com-
putation is as followas 
1000 hours (B) ~ .70 ••••••••••••• 8700.00 
600 hours {C) ~ .75••••••••••••• 450.00 
300 hours (D) ~ .so ••••••••••••• 240.00 
Total cost at standard ••••••••••• l390.00 
If the proposed work.ie simply a continuation 
ot jobs already going on in the factory and the operators 
have attained standard efficiency, the above figure will 
be an accurate guess of direct labor costa. However, if 
transfer or workers and training of operators is involved, 
an additional allowance must be made, possibly ten percent, 
to coTer the make-up P8J tor the operators during the trans-
ition period. Thie percent will vary, of course, depending 
primarily on the size or the order oince a very small job 
m~ be completed before the operators can learn their new 
job. 
The allowance tor make-up pay may be 100 percent 
in some of these instances and should be determined in con-
ference with both the foremen involved and the methods group. 
The foreman ~ill tend to guess too high as he foresees some 
or the trouble he may run into ~hereas the methods department 
will tend to gueae too low. 
The important thing to remember is that just as 
ourely aa the aun arises in the morning, make-up ooste will 
rioe if there ia any transferring of workers or training 
involTed and thia factor must be considered in making up 
estimate~ tor bids, 
The advantage of the 100% Time Premium Wage Plan 
in labor coat predetermination is that, after separating 
out the make-up pay, which 1e the result of the guaranteed 
wage, direct labor coat ia constant no matter what the speed 
or the operator may be. ~ether the operator makes 100 or 
200 per hour, the direct labor cost remains the same. This 
ie in direct contrast with the straight day rate in which 
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the cost per piece falls as the speed of the operator in-
creases. It is also contrary to some of the more complicated 
wage systems such as the Gantt, Verrick, and Halsey in which 
direct labor coste are lower per unit after standard is at-
tained since the employer takes back some of the savings 
occasioned by the higher speed of work. 
The attribute of the 100~ Time Premium Wage Plan 
of paying the full premium for work over standard can be 
ueed to some advantage in bolstering employee morale. The 
common concept among workers and supervisors is that the 
company eaves money when an operator performs over standard. 
Actually this is true for overhead costa but not for direct 
labor costa. Thia argument can be used effectively with 
a certain type ot employee who would like the premium of 
·the extra pay tor exceeding past performance but hntes to 
think that he ia saving the company money by eo doing. The 
foreman can point out to him that the worker gets the entire 
saving from the extra production and that the worker is not 
being exploited on this account. 
The above point was brought to the writer's at-
tention several years ago when he, as a foreman, started 
to attend a aeries or budget meetings held by the depart-
ment head. Like other foreman, the writer had only a vague 
concept of coat accounting and had assumed that he was 
saving money for the company as he helped his operators 
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increase their production above otnndard and that those 
o per at ora compensated for the sub-standard workers. How-
ever, when actual direct labor coats ~ere discuooed, he saw 
that the good workero did not make up for the poor ones and 
that once a toreman had brought a worker up to standard 
production, there wae nothing to be gained from a direct 
labor ooet point of view in trying to induce the worker 
to continue to increase hie production. 
In connection with the above point, it might be 
well to point out the ~akness of one of the common systems 
of comparing departmental efficiencies. This consists of 
dividing the day's production by the hourly standard to get 
the "standard hours" and dividing this into the total "actual 
hours" consumed in making this production to compute the 
percentage efficiency. 
For example, consider Department A .doing a job 
on which the standard is .6 minutes with three operators 
working 7.7 hours eaoh and making a total of 2350 units. 
This is the equivalent of 23.5 standard houra whereas 23.1 
hours were actually worked, an efficiency of 102%. Tne 
executive looking at this record makes a mental note to 
give the !oreman a raise but first calls in the cost depart~ 
ment. However, the cost department says that on the day in 
question, department A had make-up pay ot ~1~66. The exec-
utive, unable to understand the discrepancy, asks for the 
'""'
















~ig. 2 Unit cost for 100 ~ Time Premium Wage Plan 
'Production Direct Unit Over- Unit Total 
percent tabor tabor head Over- Unit 
~Jni ta effic'y (cents) Cost (cents) head Coat 
160 20 560 3.5 560 3.5 7.0 
320 40 560 1.8 560 1.8 3.6 
480 60 560 1.2 560 1.2 2.4 
540 80 560 .9 560 .9 1.8 
800 100 560 .7 560 .7 1.4 
960 120 612 .7 560 .6 1.3 
1120 140 784 .7 560 .5 1.2 
1280 160 896 .7 560 .4 1.1 
1440 180 1008 .7 660 .4 1.1 
( perce1 
ettio 1 
break-down or the tigurest 
Standard Actual Earned Guar. l!a.ke-up t'rod. Op. Hours Hours Ef'f' oy Pay Pay ~ay 
1 700 7.0 7.7 91% $4.90 ~.38 .48 
2 1050 10.5 7.7 136% 7.36 7.36 .oo 
3 600 6.0 7.7 78~ 4.20 5.38 1.18 
~350" 23.5 23:1' 102% 16.46 18.12 1.66 
The foremnn of Department A, instead of the raise, gets a 
repremand since two of hie three operators are sub-standard. 
The executive 1tould have been badly miseled had he d,epended 
nnt1~ely on the record which showed only the total depart-
mental efficiency. 
It should be noted here that .the diecusoion re· 
laten only to direct labor coste. ?rom the overall point 
ot view, taking overhead costs into consideration, the 
operator should be encouraged to exceed standard production. 
'~oot overhead coste vary directly as a function of time and 
if an operator produces 400 units per day instead of 200, 
the unit overhead coste are cut in two. 
A graphic presentation of these relationships is 
shown in fig. 2 which shows the behaviour of direct labor 
coste, and total unit costs as an operator's efficiency 
increases. 
For the purposes of this ch~rt, overhead charges 
were assumed to be 1001, of direct labor at standard. The 
data which has been plotted represents a Job with a. base 
rate ot 70¢ per hour and a standard of .6 minutes. the same 
job •hich has been used aa an example in other sections 
of this paper. 
The chart illustrates the rapid decline in direct 
labor coats ae the operator approaches 100~ efficiency and 
the subsequent leveling ott after standard performance is 
attained. Total unit cost falls less rapidly but continues 
to fall after standard has been reached. For all practical 
purposes, it reaches a limit at 180% ~ere unit costs are 
1.1~. Increasing efficiency to lOOOf, of efficiency will 
only bring an additional saving of 23% in total unit costs. 
To review briefly the arguments that have been 
presented in this chapter, the 100~ Time Premium Wage Plan 
is ideally suited to the predetermination of direct labor 
coots due to the tact that it is built up on a basis of 
standards that facilitate an accurate estimation of how 
much direct labor and how much direct labor wages will be 
required to complete a contemplated job. 
~owever, these estimates must be supplemented on 
a percentage basis to accomodate for transferring and train-
ing of help, if necessary, and the amount of this supplement 
is an inverse function of the size of the order. 
This wage plan is superior to others inasmuch as 
direct labor coste are constant no matter what the speed of 
operations and does not vary after standard has been reached. 
Departmental effecienoy should not be Judged on the 
ratio or total standard hours produced divided by the total 
number of actual hours consumed. 
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CHAPI'ER 11 
AID TO SUF.ERVI3IOH 
One day at the plant while the writer waa dis-
cussing the hardships ot being a foreman with particular 
reference to production problems, hie division head pointed 
out that the wage incentive plan automatically took care 
of production as tar as the operator waa concerned and that 
actually the foreman need only worry about personnel prob-
lema, material, planning and scheduling, and costs. 
This waa a new idea entirely to the writer but 
1 f one analyse a the problem, the truth of the statement 
become a apparent. ~ben production falls down in a depart-
ment, it is generally due to one or a combination of three 
main causes 1 lack of material, excessive absenteeism, or 
machine trouble. It is very seldom that a foreman oan 
truthfully say that production is low because the operators 
do not want to work; these few occasions being possibly 
the day before a holiday or a Friday afternoon. Once an 
operator baa been brought up to strmdard and has started 
to earn some extra money, the wage incentive system auto-
matically takes over much of the production head-aohe'. As 
soon as a foreman learns this lesson, he can worry lees 
about production and spend more of his time on personnel 
and scheduling problems to keep his department running 
emoothly. 
/ 
However, there ia juct one word of caution to 
be added. The first hour of the shift is tremendously im-
-portant in any wage incentive plan. If for some reason the 
first hour's production is poor and the operator feels that 
it will be impossible to make any bonus for the day, the 
tendency will be for the operator to do the minimum of work 
possible for the day. This is the reason why it is eo im-
portant for a foreman to be on the production floor at the 
beginning of hie shift in order to see that adequate ma-
terial ie available, that machines are operating properly, 
and that the operators start to work promptly. Especially 
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if group bonus is involved, it is important to be very strict, 
as far as tardiness goea since if one operator is ten or 
fifteen minutes late, the production of her group may be so 
poor for the first hour that they will be discouraged from 
trying to earn bonua for the rest of the day. 
In view of the above fact, we should amend our 
original principle to say that if the workers in hie depart-
ment have satisfactory production for their fdrst hour's 
work, the foreman can then safely turn his attention to 
some of the more indirect activities aesociat·ed with the 
running of hie department. 
The 100~ Time Premium Wage Plan possesses this 
attribute of aiding the foreman in production but probably 
to no greater extent than other wage incentive plans. The 
greatest fault of the d81 rate system is that it offers no 
such aid to the foreman who must rely on non-financial in-
There is one aid available to supervision offered 
by aome incentive plane that the 100~ Time Premium Wage 
Plan definitely lacks and that is the assurance of consist-
ent day to day production. Consistent production 1e greatly 
to be desired to avoid the creation of excessive inventories 
of sub-assemblies which may be extremely sensitive to phy-
sical deterioration or obsolescence as in the radio tube · 
industry. Since the plan does not furnish a strong 1n9ent-
1ve to make standard and, secondly, has a relatively strong 
incentive above standard, there is a tendency for production 
to vary from day to day from the same group of operators. 
For example, it vas common in the plant under discussion 
to have production 10% higher on Tuesdays and Wednesd~e 
.simply because the ~orkers felt more like working on those 
particular days. About 50% of the operators could be de-
pended on to turn out the same production day after day but 
others might be 140~ efficient on Tuesdays and ~ednesdaya 
but only 120~ efficient on the other days of the week. 
If these variations are consistent week after 
week, the foreman oan anticipate them but, other things 
being equal, a wage incentive plan that encourages even 
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production is to be deoired. This point is stressed by 
n. H. Lannbursh and ~. R. Spriegell who point out that 
"Incentive wage systems which are developed ~o have work-
ers make a set task rather thento excel a set .task are beat 
suited to the demands of modern managerial oontrola.u It 
is claimed that some wage oyeteme cuoh ~ the Gantt ~hioh 
pays from 201-50~ of the base rate as a bonus for making 
standard have the effect of causing the operator to reaoh 
etandard practically every time. This has the advantage 
also of aiding the predetermination of overhead expense as 
well as the direct labor coots. Eut there is no evidence 
that any of these plane control the ceiling of the worker's 
output except through an arbi"trary "cut-off~ such as was 
used in the plant being ~ascribed and which has been die-
cussed previously. Unusually high production can cause 
almost as much trouble as low production because of its 
upsetting effect on inventories and planning and scheduling 
in other departments. 
~riefly to summarize this chapter, we can say 
that all wage incentive plans a.id supervision in getting 
out the production but that the systems auch ao the Gantt 
which pay a high bonus for making standard probably aid 
in making the amount of production more oonaiatent. · An 
1. Richard H. Laneburgh and William R. Spriegel, Industrial 
uana.gement, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. New York, 1940 pg. 426 
6t! 
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arbitrary ·"aut-off" may be used to set an upper lim! t on 
production which may be necessary to maintain the proper 
. . 
ratio of inventories~ 
Good production in a plant depends on a good 
first hour and the foreman should be on hand at the_begin-
ning of the shift to make aure that the workere·have the 
proper material, that their machines are operating properly, 
and that they start their jobs promptly. 
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CHAPTER 12 
PO~ULARITY WITH 'MANAGEl&.NT AliD tnTIONS 
The ultimate teet of any wage plan is in its 
being ao~epted and used; and statistics show that ~age 
plans based on piece rates are the most popular with man-
agement. There is also e~idence that these types are more 
popular with labor unions both for the comparative si~ 
plioity, ~hidh has been mentioned before, and also as a 
basis of establishing standards among competiting plants, 
a point which will be discussed further. 
In 1940, the National Industrial Conference Board 
' . 
made a survey of 2,700 companieel which employed approxi-
. 
mately 5,000,000 workers in plants which were representative 
of all kinds and sizes of business in the United States. 
51.7( of this miscellaneous group used wage incentives but 
of the 900 mapufaoturing companies included in the group, 
75~ used wage incentives. 
Of the 313 companies.which furnished more specific 
information, 60 .3~~ of the employees "YihO were on some in-
oenti~e plan were on piece-rate plans in contrast with 30.9% 
of employees who were on various premium or bonus plans. 
A somewhat emnller sampling survey was made by 
the American Management Association in 1943 which covered 
1. National Industrial Conference Board, Studies in 
t'ereonne 1 Policies, No. 19 -
50 representative manufacturing companies. In these ~lante, 
62~ of the direct workers were on an-~ttra•financial incent-
ive basis. 5t-' of the wage plans used were of the piece 
work type t 'Piece rate, 28-t and Standard Hour, 23%. Of the 
other plana, 17~ were ~edaux, 17~ were Halsey and other 
premium types, and 15~ were miscellaneous. 
Cne ot the factors influencing the uee of the 
piece rate type of plan seems to be that· unions fa.vor thia 
type over the more complicated forms. The early hostility 
of labor organizations to any type of speed up has been re-
placed in some industries by an attitude of tolerance and 
in other industries by an attitude of some co-operation. 
An example of the latter is in the apparel in~ 
dustry where the Dress lmnufacturers' Association and the 
International Ladies• Garment ~orkers Union co-operated in 
the establishment of a "Teet Shop~.l Standard times to 
make a garment of any style or-material were set on the 
basis of time studies made chiefly by the union's industrial 
engineers. In this manner, the element of piece work prices 
reeolved itself into negotiations as to the baee rates. 
there was no haggling on individual piecework prices and 
from the data collected it was possible to aet up standards 
applying to different conditions in dif~erent shops. 
1.' L.P. Alford.and J.R, ~angs, Editors, Production Handbook 
Ronald Press, New York, 1945• ~· 46l 
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iTed joinerl has made an extensive study of the 
apparel inouetry and the uoe -of piece rates. He reporter 
There are economic factors inherent in certain 
industries which seem to make piece-work or 
other incentive plane logicnl forma of wage 
payment. Unions in these industries are aware 
of the p~oblems and have made little effort to 
eliminate such plans. For example, piece work 
in general has been acceptable to unions in 
·the apparel trades because of the importance 
of manual skill and control, which results in 
wide variations in the individual worker's 
productivity. Thus there is nlways n sizable 
group of faster workers who may feel that a 
change to time work would cause a decrease in 
earnings. In addition, the apparel industries 
are subject to wide eee.sonal fluctuations in 
production and employment. Unions in these 
industries practice rigid work sharing during 
alack seasons. 'I'he piece work method makes work 
ehari'ng possible since employer•a are a.ceurcd 
of a fixed labor cost regardless of the amount 
of work to be done. Unions raalize that without 
this fixed lnbor cost per unit of output, very 
few employers would consent to the rigid work 
sharing which both the union and the workers 
feel to be desirable in these industries. 
Also these unions have adopted a 
policy of stabilizing labor aosto among competing 
employers. Piece work facilitates stabilization 
since unit labor coots cun be determined in nd· 
vance and do not depend on the relative efficiency 
of the individual \vorker or eatabli ahment. 
The ~riter regrate that r.o much of the material 
in this section io quoted from outside sources but his.ex-
perience ~ith unions hau been restricted to contacta with 
them while both the A.F.L. and C.I.a. Uniono were trying 
1. ~red H. Seiner, Incentive Wage·Plane and Collective 
Bargaining, U.3. Gov. ITint. Off. 1942 No;-717, pg.5 
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uneucceesfully to organize the ~orkers in the plant under 
discussion. However, it io interesting to note that the 
campaign of the C.I.O. emphasized the "speed up~ approach. 
The following is quoted from a flyer 1 passed out at the 
company entrance shortly before the ballotting: 
X Company's hunger for more and more production 
has resulted in n terrific speed up for the girls. 
Tube L l~ has been changed to F 12 and a higher 
standard rate has been set on exactly the same ' 
tube. 
The maddening speed-up haa resulted in Yr. 
Spencer acting tougher and driving the girls. 
ne is constantly looking over the shoulders of 
the girls in an attempt to put pressure on them 
for f~ster work. He is always calling in girls 
to the office and aaking them to work faster. 
You see girls--- Yr. Spencer bas a quota to . 
make that doeen•t take into consideration your 
health or welfare. · Mr. Spencer is not worried 
about your beefs. All he is worried about is 
T.'RODUCTI Oll. 
To summarize, we can say that reliable surveys 
of a large group of rnunufncturera indicate a preference 
in actual use of the piece rate type or wage plans of which 
the 100< Time Premium Wage Plan is a modification; and we 
can say that it is probably least offensive to labor unions. 
The indications are that in the apparel industry, the piece 
r~te type of plan is favored by labor unions since it offers 
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a basis for sharing the work and atandardizing wages and coste. 
1. United 1Ueotrical, Radio and )lachine Workers of America, 
affi li;:.~.ted with the Congress of Indue trial Organization, 
50 Trumbull St. ~·orcester, Mass. Flyer, 1946 
CHAPTER 13 
CONCLUSION' 
The purpose of this paper was. a critical analysis 
of the 100% Time Premium Wage Plan. However, although 
analysis has ita place in the scientific approach to any 
problem. it is of little value until it has been a factor 
leading to a logical conclusion. 
The preponderance of the evidence is in favor of 
the plan. It has several advantages that outweigh the fact 
that in a few specific instances it may be surpassed b,y 
other wage plans. The general trend in industry in towards 
a more liberal policy to employees and there ia little 
doubt that this plan offers m~re to the employee than other 
plans now in use in industry. 
From the point of view of the worker, this plan 
offers a feeling or security and at the same time provides 
an opportunity for advancement both through step increases 
, in the base rate and through earnings that are limited only 
by the employee's ability to produce. The plan is simple 
and clearJ the worker can compute his earnings himself with-
out a calculating machine. There is little opportunity for 
the employer to lower the rate by the manipulation of hid-
den factors. Rates are fixed by time study and are not 
subject to the personal opinion of a supervisor. 
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. From management's point of view, the plan offers 
several advantagess 
First, since it is generally liked by the employees 
it aids morale and makea for better understanding; 
3~cond, it provides for differences between jobs 
and operators by variation of the base rate; 
Third, it provides for paying operators during 
their training period and during a period o~ changing over 
of products or process; 
Fourth, it provides a strong incentive above 
standard with the resulting lowering of to_tal unit costa; 
Fifth, it facilitates planning and scheduling 
and the predetermination of direct l~bor costs; 
Sixth. it is easily computed and readily adaptable 
to cost accounting methods; 
Seventh; it aids supervision by relieving the 
foreman and supervisors of part of their production prob-
lem. 
The disadvantages of the system can all be blamed 
on one facto'r, the fact that the plan does not provide a. 
method of keeping individu~l production within a narrow 
range. These disadvantages are: 
First, an added burden on supervision to bring 
workers up to standard and keep them there. 
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Second, a wide range of output which produces 
unbalanced inventories which may necessitate transferring 
operators to different jobs with resulting higher labor 
cost and lower morale; 
Third, the need of the imposition of an ar-
bitrary ceiling to maintain good quality which is contrary 
to the principle that earnings should be unlimited and 
which. in some aaaee, results in the limitation of ~reported~ 
output but not "actual'• output and tends to lower qua.li ty. 
Fourth, the inability to predetermine indirect 
labor costs aa accurately as some other wage plano. 
One incentive plan alone cannot be expected to 
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fit all production situations. The executive who has the 
responsibility of selecting the proper plan needs to· take 
many factors into consideration. For example, if the degrees 
of skill involved are not high and the inventory is not of 
a. perishable nature, there will not be the need tor control-
ling output within a narrow range. As a result, this defeat 
of the 100% Time Premium Wage Plan ~hen it is used in the 
construction of radio tubes may cease to be ~ liability. 
However, the plan certainly has many strong points 
and it certainly should be considered seriously by anybody 
looking for an incentive plan. 
It was not the purpose of this paper to discuss 
incentive plans generally as oontraated with day rates. 
There are several factors such as quality, material usage, 
cost of material, and others which are general problems of 
all~. incentive plane. Tha.t is, if we can make a further 
generalization, if quality is poorer as a result of wage 
incent-ive plans, it will be no poorer.under the 100% Time 
Premium Wage Plan than under the Halsey or Gantt plans; and 
similarly, if material usage is higher under the Halsey 
I 
plan, it will probably be just ae high under the Gantt or 
the 100( Time Premium Wage Plan. These are problems that 
management must solve whatever wage incentive plan it may 
choose. 
Rather it was the purpose of this paper to illus-
trate some of the practical problems that arose from the use 
of a plan similar to the 100% Time Premium Wage Plan in a 
small factory and to show some workable methods of dealing 
with them. Some of the books previously written on the sub-
ject have been written from an ·"ivory tower" but in this 
paper the writer has tried to take the reader out onto the 
production floor, into the front line trenches, so to speak, 
and show him the working of the plan both from the point of 
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